Book Review of The Case for Animal Rights by Cohen, Henry
EM 11VII 
 
Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights,� 
Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press� 
1983, pp. xvii + 425� 
The  blurb  on  the  dust  jacket  of  
Tom Regan's  The Case for Animal 
Rights claims  that  the  book  "is  des­
tined  to  become  a 'modern  classic'  in 
the  field  of  ethics,  alongside  Rawl's  A 
Theory of Justice and  Nozick's  Anar­
chy,  State  and  Utopia." I took  this  
with  a large  grain  of  salt,  but  I lost  
my scepticism  as  I read  the  book  and  
realized  that  Regan  was  offeri ng  a 
remarkable,  full-blown  theory  of  
rights,  covering  humans  and  animals.  
I won't  be  so  bold  as  to  predict  that  
it  wi II have  the  impact  of  A Theory  of  
Justice, but it  would  certainly  be  a 
pity  if it  were  read  only  by  those  
interested  in animal  rights.  The Case 
for Animal Rights is a major  contribu­
tion  to  moral  philosophy  generally  and  
to  the  animal  rights  movement  in par­
ticular,  the  latter  because  it  is  by  far  
the  most  ambitious  work  in the  field  
and  because  philosophers  who  read  it  
will no  longer  be  able  to  ignore  animal  
rights,  as  Rawls  did  in A Theory  of  
Justice.  
Regan's  theory  of  rights  is not  
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simple, although it is expressed in 
eminently precise and lucid language. 
It makes the case for animal rights 
without appeal to emotion, and does 
not discuss specific injustices to ani­
mals until the final chapter, after the 
theory has been delineated. Because 
of its complexity and strict adherence 
to reasoned argument, it will not 
replace Peter Singer's Animal Libera­
tion as the best book for introducing 
non-philosophers to the cause of ani­
mal rights (notwithstanding Regan's 
devastati ng critiq ue of Singer's uti Iit­
arian philosophy). 
Here are the bare bones of Regan's 
case for animal rights. (Regan 
argues for each step in detail, with 
counterarguments presented and 
refuted; what follows are only his 
major conclusions.) Animals at 
least normal mammals aged one yea r or 
more are conscious and exh ibit 
perception, memory, desires, beliefs, 
self-con sciou s ness, intention s, a nd a 
sense of the future. Possession of 
these attributes makes an animal the 
subject-of-a-life, and Regan postulates 
that every subject-of-a-life has inher­
ent value. This means that it has a 
val ue that is independent of its uti Iity 
to anyone else and of the quality of 
its experiences. Although the inher­
ent value of subjects-of-a-life is a 
postu late, Regan does not adopt it 
a rbitrari Iy; rather, he defends it on 
the g rou nd that without it, we cou Id 
not account for our intuitive beliefs 
about when it is wrong to harm indi­
viduals. 
Regan, furthermore, argues that 
all subjects-of-a-life have equal inher­
ent value. This does not mean, as 
one might suppose, that, if faced with 
the choice of savi ng a drown ing 
human or a drowning dog, one should 
flip a coin. As will be discussed 
below, Regan thin ks that in most 
cases we should choose the human. 
Rather, to have equal inherent value 
means every individual's inherent 
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value must be respected by all moral 
agents rega rdless of the conse­
quences. This, of course, is con­
trary to the utilitarian view, which 
would permit individual interests to be 
overridden in the interests of the 
overall good. 
The principle that moral agents 
must respect every individual's inher­
ent value regardless of the conse­
quences is Regan's "respect principle" 
-- his sole categorical priciple. This 
principle implies that individuals with 
in herent val ue have a valid claim, and 
hence a right, to respectful treatment 
-- a right that is independent of an 
individual's voluntary acts and of his 
position within any institutional 
arrangement. 
From the respect principle Regan 
derives fou r other principles: the 
harm principle, which is the prima 
facie direct duty not to harm anyone 
with inherent value; the minimize 
overriding ("miniride") principle, 
which is that,. special considerations 
aside, when we must choose between 
overriding the rights of the innocent 
many or the innocent few, and each 
affected individual will be affected in 
a comparable way, then we should 
override the rights of the few; the 
worse-off principle, which is that, 
special considerations aside, when we 
must choose between overriding the 
rights of the innocent many or the 
innocent few, and the harm faced by 
the few wou Id ma ke them worse-off 
than any of the many would be if any 
other option were chosen, we shou Id 
override the rights of the many; and 
the liberty principle, which is that, 
provided all those involved are treated 
with respect, and assuming that no 
special considerations obtain, any 
innocent individual has the right to 
act to avoid bei ng made worse-off 
even if doing so harms other inno­
cents. 
As an example of the application of 
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the miniride principle, Regan argues 
that, if faced with a choice of savi ng 
fifty trapped miners or one trapped 
miner, we have an obligation to save 
the fifty because the death of all 
would be a comparable harm, and the 
miniride principle requires that in 
such ci rcumstances we save the many. 
As an example of the application of 
the worse-off principle, Regan argues 
that (here I am changing the hypo­
thetical slightly), if faced with a 
choice of saving the lives of one nor­
mal adult human or any number of 
animals, we should save the human on 
the ground that a human's death 
would be an incomparably greater 
harm to him than the death of anyone 
of the animals would be to it. The 
reason the human's death would be a 
greater harm is that "the magnitude of 
the harm that death is, is a function 
of the number and variety of opportu­
nities for satisfaction it forecloses" 
(p. 314). This point raises several 
questions that Regan does not ade­
quately add ress. 
First, how do we compa re the 
opportu n ities for flyi ng under one's 
own power or living underwater with 
experiences that normal humans have? 
As Thomas Nagel asked in a famous 
ph ilosophy a rticle, "What is it like to 
be a bat?" It sounds as if Regan 
believes that all subjects-of-a-life 
have equal inherent value, but some 
are more equal than others. Admit­
tedly, it isi ntu itive to conclude that 
the life of a human is worth more than 
that of an animal, but to whom is it 
intuitive? To humans, of course. 
Second, who is not a normal human 
being? Presumably Regan has in mind 
the severely retarded or senile, but 
what about a quadriplegic but mentally 
normal human: should he be saved 
rather than any number of animals? 
His variety of opportunities for satis­
faction is surely diminished, but how 
does one weigh the satisfactions 
foreclosed by a human's physical 
handicap against those foreclosed by 
an animal's natural mental limitations? 
Third, doesn't computing potential 
satisfactions to determine rights smack 
of utilitarianism, even if aggregating 
is not permitted? Perhaps what 
should be computed is the potential 
life expectancy of each individual, or, 
to avoid favoring humans and tor­
toises, the percentage of an individu­
al's life that remains to be lived. 
Fou rth, even if we compa re poten­
tia satisfactions that would be forec­
losed, are these not in part a function 
of age? Regan briefly acknowledges 
that age is significant (p. 303), but 
provides no guidance for consid,ering 
it. What if the human is ninety (but 
not senile) and each animal is young 
and healthy? This question also 
a ri ses when the choice is to save one 
human or fifty humans. Under the 
miniride principle, assuming compara­
ble harms, the fifty should be saved. 
But are the harms comparable if each 
of the fifty has a life expectancy of 
six years and the one has a life 
expectancy of sixty years? 
There is one other conclusion that 
Regan defends too cu rsori Iy; it is that 
the respect principle imposes on all 
moral agents "the prima facie duty to 
assist those who a re the victims of 
injustice at the hands of others" (p. 
249) . The existence of this duty 
leads Regan to contend that merely to 
become a vegetarian but not to work 
to change the opinion of others "is to 
become part of the problem rather 
than part of the solution" (p. 353). 
This is counterintuitive, at least to 
this reviewer, and might be taken as 
rhetorical except that The Case for 
Animal Rights contains no other sem­
blance of rhetoric. How much of 
one's life must be devoted to fighting 
against injustices committed by others? 
Utilitarians, of course, face this 
problem too. 
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I hope that the questions I have the principles he expounds. The 
raised will be understood as an invi­- Case forf  Animal Rightst  is beyond· 
tation to Regan and others to clarify question the most important philosoph­-
the case for animal rights, and not as ical contribution to animal rights and 
questioning the value of Regan's book is a major work in moral philosophy. 
or even, necessarily, the validity of 
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